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I. INTRODUCTION
Martha Cordero has lived in San Antonio her whole life. She spent
most of her childhood in various foster families and group homes, but
today she is homeless. Some nights she is able to stay with friends;
occasionally she is able to stay at a local shelter. Unfortunately, on this
night she is unable to get in touch with her friends and the shelter is
full. Now she is looking for a place to spend the night. With no alter-
natives, Martha decides to camp on a park bench in downtown San
Antonio. As she is preparing her bed of cardboard and blankets, a
police officer approaches her. The officer looks at her personal be-
longings and then issues Martha a citation for camping in public. He
tells her to move on. Frustrated, Martha asks, "Where should I go?"1
Unfortunately, Martha's story is not uncommon. The population of
San Antonio, Texas is growing and as of 2003, was estimated to be
1,214,725;2 of those, some 22,000 people are estimated to be homeless.3
Recognizing the seriousness of this situation, Ed Garza, Mayor of San
Antonio, established a task force to address the problem of homelessness
in San Antonio.4
Responding to the mayor's charge, the task force developed a ten-year
plan to end chronic homelessness in the City of San Antonio.5 The Ten-
Year Plan's objective stated: "By the year 2014, all individuals facing
chronic homelessness in the greater San Antonio area will have alterna-
tives and access to safe, decent and affordable housing and the resources
and supports needed to sustain housing."6 On January 13, 2005, the
Mayor's Task Force on homelessness presented its findings to the city
1. Interview with Martha Cordero, in San Antonio, Tex. (Feb. 2, 2005).
2. U.S. Census Bureau Website, State & County QuickFacts, San Antonio, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/4865000.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
3. Abraham Mahshie, Like a Rolling Stone, SAN ANTONIO CURRENT, Oct. 9, 2003,
http://www.zwire.com/site/printerFriendly.cfm?brd=2318&dept-id=484045&newsid=
10288895.
4. TEN-YEAR PLAN TO END CHRONIC HOMELESSNESS, MAYOR'S TASK FORCE ON
HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS i (2005), available at http://
www.sanantonio.gov/comminit/pdf/Plan toEndHomelessness.pdf. [hereinafter TEN-
YEAR PLAN].
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1.
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council; the plan was approved.7 However, less than one month later the
city council supported a far different proposal.8 On February 3, 2005 lo-
cal businessman and City Councilman Roger Flores presented the city
council with four ordinances that directly affect San Antonio's homeless
population.9
Though the ordinances seemed to contradict the city's Ten-Year Plan,
the city council approved them with only one dissenting voice. The ordi-
nances provided as follows:
Ordinance 100378 - Prohibits sitting or lying down in the right-of-
way in public places; and providing for a criminal fine in an amount
not to exceed $500.00 for violation of this ordinance.
Ordinance 100379 - Prohibits camping in public places without law-
ful permission or permit; and providing for a criminal fine in an
amount not to exceed $500.00 for violation of this ordinance.
Ordinance 100380 - Prohibits aggressive solicitation in public areas
and certain businesses; and providing for a criminal fine in an
amount not to exceed $500.00 for violation of this ordinance.
Ordinance 100381 - Prohibits urinating and defecating in public; and
providing for a criminal fine in an amount not to exceed $500.00 for
violation of this ordinance. 10
Historical background may shed some light on the bases for these con-
trasting approaches. Traditionally, there has been a tension between the
local downtown businesses and the homeless population because the
downtown area businesses perceive the area homeless to be a threat to
their economic livelihood. It was in response to this perceived threat that
Councilman Flores stressed the importance of the enactment of the four
ordinances."
7. Reg. Meeting of the City Council of the City of San Antonio, Held in the Council
Chambers (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.sanantonio.gov/clerk/minutes/2005/
20050113.htm.
8. Reg. Meeting of the City Council of the City of San Antonio, Held in the Council
Chambers (Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://www.sanantonio.gov/clerk/minutes/2005/2005
0203.htm [hereinafter Meeting] (noting that the approval of the Ten-Year Plan was fol-
lowed by the enactment of an ordinance that targeted the city's homeless population).
9. See id.; see also The Other San Antonio (KSAT 12 News television broadcast Dec.
20, 2005) (on file with The Scholar) (stating that Roger Flores was the architect of the
ordinances).
10. Meeting, supra note 8 (citing The Other San Antonio, supra note 9 (noting that
homeless in San Antonio complain about how the new ordinances adversely affect them)).
Council members Flores, Segovia, Barrera, Hall, Schubert, Haass, and Garza voted in
favor of the four ordinances while Councilwoman Radle was the sole vote against them.
Four council members were absent and did not vote.
11. The Other San Antonio, supra note 9.
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Immediately after these ordinances were passed, advocates for San
Antonio's local homeless population criticized the new ordinances. 12
Supporters for the homeless argued that the ordinances do little more
than criminalize a person's status as homeless.' 3 In fact, even some mem-
bers of San Antonio's City Council were perplexed by the ordinances.
Patti Radle, Councilwoman for District 5, stated that the ordinances di-
rectly undermined the city's goals by implementing the Ten-Year Plan. 4
Councilwoman Radle noted the city's own admission that San Antonio
did not have sufficient facilities or shelter space to care for the home-
less. 5 She added: "We were acknowledging that homeless people did not
have alternatives, and then we were punishing the homeless for behavior
that they could not help." 6
Failing to address this obvious inconsistency, proponents for the city
ordinances argue for their necessity in order to maintain the economic
health of area businesses. 7 In fact, Roger Flores stated that the purpose
of the ordinances was to increase the earning potential of the city's down-
town businesses.' 8 To the contrary, homeless advocates argue that the
city's ordinances leave the homeless with no options.' 9 They note that
without enough shelter space or public restrooms, the city has essentially
criminalized behavior that the homeless are incapable of controlling. 0
Adding weight to this argument is the fact that the current mayor of San
Antonio, Phil Hardberger, stated that the City of San Antonio had not
done enough to provide for its homeless citizens and specifically stated
that the city needed a twenty-four hour shelter.2 '
San Antonio is not the first municipality to enact ordinances that target
the homeless. Within the last two decades, laws that target the homeless
have become increasingly common in large metropolitan areas in the
12. KSAT.com, Critics Blast City's New Homeless Rules, Mar. 17, 2005, available at
http://www.ksat.com/print/4293759/detail.html (turning the homeless into criminals).
13. Id.
14. Telephone Interview with Patti Radle, City Representative, Council District 5,
City of San Antonio, in San Antonio, Tex. (Jan. 26, 2006).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Jennifer Hodulik, Comment, The Drug Court Model as a Response to "Broken
Windows" Criminal Justice for the Homeless Mentally Ill, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1073, 1079 (2001) (citing Maria Foscarinis, Kelly Cunningham-Bowers & Kristin E. Brown,
Out of Sight - Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward the Criminalization of Home-
lessness, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 145, 154 (1999).
18. The Other San Antonio, supra note 9.
19. KSAT.com, supra note 12.
20. Id.
21. The Other San Antonio, supra note 9.
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United States.2 2 Anti-vagrancy laws that punish those who appear to be
homeless can be traced back to colonial times.23 These laws were not
successfully challenged until the 1972 Supreme Court case of Papachris-
tou v. City of Jacksonville.24. Since the Court's ruling in Papachristou,
there has been an on-going battle between advocates for the homeless
and cities who wish to address the problems associated with homelessness
through legislation.25
This comment will focus on the constitutionality of two San Antonio
ordinances:
1.) Ordinance 100379 which prohibits camping in public and, 2.) Ordi-
nance 100380 which prohibits aggressive panhandling. This comment will
then present the legal history of similar ordinances in the United States.
The last section will analyze and apply those holdings to the newly-en-
acted homeless ordinances in San Antonio.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENTS PROHIBITION ON
CRIMINALIZING STATUS
Ordinance 100379 prohibits camping in public places without lawful
permission.26 San Antonio is not the first municipality to enact such leg-
islation; municipal governments around the country have enacted similar
ordinances that prevent public camping, sleeping, or both.27 Advocates
for the homeless argue that local governments are motivated by a desire
to force homeless people out of economically-desirable locations within a
22. See generally Kristen Brown, Outlawing Homelessness, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE,
July/Aug. 1999, http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/106/brown.htm (citing laws against the
homeless that various cities have enacted in recent years); see also Harry Simon, Towns
Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless
Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REv. 631, 648 (1992).
23. Jason Leckerman, Comment, City of Brotherly Love?: Using the Fourteenth
Amendment to Strike Down an Anti-Homeless Ordinance in Philadelphia, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 540, 546 (2001) (citing Simon, supra note 22, at 638 (noting that vagrancy legisla-
tion in America started in colonial times and closely followed English models)).
24. See generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
25. Simon, supra note 22, at 647 (explaining that with the invalidation of vagrancy and
loitering laws, cities have adopted new methods to communicate the message that the
homeless and poor are not welcome in their communities).
26. Meeting, supra note 8; see also SA Homeless Action, New San Antonio Laws
(Feb. 13, 2005), available at http://sa-homeless.blogspot.com/2005/02/new-san-antonio-laws.
html.
27. Brown, supra note 22 (stating that in a survey of the fifty largest cities in the
United States, seventy-three percent of them had laws which either restricted or prohibited
camping or sleeping).
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city.28 Laws that prohibit sleeping in public places, or in defined public
areas at certain times, are known as public use restrictions. 29 Advocates
for the homeless have successfully challenged many public use restric-
tions by utilizing the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.30
A. Historical Perspective
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "cruel and unusual punishments [cannot be] inflicted."'" Prior to
1910, the Supreme Court did not give serious consideration to the mean-
ing of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment prohibi-
tion.32 From 1789 to 1910, it appears that American judges were guided
by the principle that the Eighth Amendment was only a prohibition
against specific forms of physical punishment.33 During this time, some
argued that the scope of the Eighth Amendment should extend to pro-
scribe punishments that were unfairly disproportionate to the crime com-
mitted, but such arguments were rejected by the courts.3 4 As a result, the
Eighth Amendment was largely considered boilerplate and believed by
legal scholars to be obsolete.35 However, in 1910, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the purpose for the Eighth Amendment was not
only to prevent certain physical punishments, but also to prevent the
abuse of governmental power.36
28. Antonia K. Fasanelli, Note, In re Eichorn: The Long Awaited Implementation of
the Necessity Defense in a Case of the Criminalization of Homelessness, 50 AM. U. L. REV.
323, 331-32 (2001).
29. Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless Legal Advocacy: New Challenges and Directions for
the Future, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215, 1237 (2003).
30. Juliette Smith, Comment, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Para-
digm for Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 293,319 (1996).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32. John B. Wefing, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 20 SETON HALL L. REv. 478, 483
(1990).
33. Smith, supra note 30, at 306 (noting that courts "certainly prohibited 'quartering,
disemboweling alive, gibbeting (hanging in chains to starve to death), burning alive, cruci-
fixion, breaking on the wheel, strangling to death, burying alive, boiling alive in water, oil
or lead, and blowing [a person] from a cannon's mouth," among other methods (citing
LARRY C. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 9-10 (1975))).
34. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Origi-
nal Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969) (citing 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 694 (8th ed. 1927)).
35. Id. at 842.
36. See generally Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see also Smith, supra
note 30, at 307.
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In Weems v. United States,3 7 the Supreme Court used the Eighth
Amendment as a basis for overturning an excessively long, hard-labor
sentence as punishment for forgery of a cash book.38 After the Weems
decision, the Court again utilized the Eighth Amendment to overturn
punishments including banishment, expatriation, and even the failure to
provide adequate medical care for prisoners. 39 However, these holdings
were limited in their effect because the Eighth Amendment was not made
applicable to the states until 1962.40 In 1962, the Supreme Court, in
Robinson v. California,4 held that the Eighth Amendment also prohib-
ited laws that criminalize a person's status. 42 As author Edward J. Wal-
ters noted, this holding has become significant to advocates for the
homeless, because after it was handed down, many states overturned laws
that prohibited "joblessness and purposelessness as unconstitutionally
based on status, thus extending Eighth Amendment protection to many
homeless people.,
43
B. The Robinson Doctrine
In Robinson v. California a police officer testified that he arrested the
defendant after observing track marks on the defendant's arms.44 Al-
though he witnessed no affirmative act of drug use on the part of the
defendant, based on his years of experience with the police force, the
officer concluded that the defendant was a drug user.45 The defendant
was convicted under a California state law that made drug addiction a
37. See Weems, 217 U.S. 349.
38. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 30, at 307.
39. Smith, supra note 30, at 308 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Dear Wing
Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1962); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp.
257, 278 (D. Md. 1972)).
40. See Wefing, supra note 32, at 483 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667
(1962)) (holding that a state law that imprisons a person for being a drug addict inflicts
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
THOMAS E. PATrERSON, WE THE PEOPLE: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN
POLITICS 91 (4th ed. 2002), available at http://www.everything2.com/index.pl?node=
Amendment%20XIV (The significance of the Fourteenth Amendment is to guarantee
"civil liberties of individual Americans and to protect these individual rights from action by
state and local government.").
41. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
42. Id. at 666; see also Smith, supra note 30, at 308. Status crimes are defined as those
offenses that punish people for who they are rather than what they do. See generally id.;
Edward J. Walters, Comment, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment Protection for Do-or-Die
Acts of the Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619, 1619 (1995).
43. Walters, supra note 42, at 1632.
44. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661.
45. Id. at 661-62.
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criminal offense, even in the absence of a criminal act.46 The Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction and held that the state law was
cruel and unusual and a violation of the Eighth Amendment for two rea-
sons. First, an addiction could be acquired without a conscious choice;
and second, no affirmative act -was involved in the alleged crime.47 Sim-
ply stated, Robinson established both an act test and a culpability test.48
Thus, a law would be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual if a defendant
was penalized solely because of his or her mental state absent an affirma-
tive action (act test), or for an act the defendant could not avoid (culpa-
bility test).4 9
Specifically, the Robinson Doctrine has been used as a basis to chal-
lenge laws that target the homeless by prohibiting sleeping or camping in
public.5" There has been some success associated with the argument that
because sleeping or camping in public is an involuntary act for a homeless
person, and that punishing a person for this act is equivalent to criminal-
izing a person's status of being homeless.5 However, municipal govern-
ments have successfully cited Powell v. Texas,52 a later Supreme Court
case- which expounded upon the Robinson Doctrine, to establish that laws
prohibiting public camping or public sleeping are not a violation of the
Constitution.53
C. Powell v. Texas
In the case of Powell v. Texas, the Supreme Court moved away from its
earlier definition of status crime.5 4 In Powell, the defendant was arrested
for being drunk in public.55 The defendant argued that he was an alco-
holic and could not control his drinking, and that punishing him for this
conduct would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment as applied in Robinson.56 However, the Court
46. Id. at 662.
47. Id. at 666-68; see also Walters, supra note 42, at 1622.
48. Walters, supra note 42, at 1627.
49. Id. at 1627.
50. Smith, supra note 30, at 319.
51. Id.
52. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
53. Walters, supra note 42, at 1624.
54. Id.
55. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 517.
56. Id. (noting, that the trial court made three findings of fact that the appellant was a
chronic alcoholic, however the Court held that these were not findings of fact in a tradi-
tional sense, but rather were syllogisms transparently designed to bring the case within the
scope of the Court's holding in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
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made a distinction between public intoxication and alcoholism, and ulti-
mately affirmed the defendant's conviction.57
In Powell, the Court held that the appellant had not been punished for
his status as an alcoholic, but instead, for committing the act of being
drunk in public. 8 Specifically, the Court held that the purpose of the
holding in Robinson was not to determine whether a person's conduct
was "in some sense involuntary," rather, its holding was intended to pre-
vent a person from being punished for a crime if they did not commit an
act.59 Within this reasoning, the plurality in Powell created an "act-ex-
cluding" test, intended to identify status crimes: if the defendant had
committed an act, any act, then that defendant lost any Eighth Amend-
ment protection under the Robinson Doctrine.6' As a result, if a court
uses Powell as the basis of its holding, then the "act-excluding" test pro-
vides protection for those ordinances that target the homeless.6' A court
relying on Powell's plurality opinion will hold that the act itself, (in this
case, sleeping or camping in public) is being punished, and not the status
of being homeless.62
Furthermore, the plurality in Powell provided municipalities yet an-
other instrument to use to protect their anti-sleeping or camping ordi-
nances from the Robinson Doctrine by distinguishing between a person's
"status" and a person's "condition., 63 The distinction that has evolved in
cases following Powell is as follows: "status" is something that is gained
involuntarily, such as characteristics acquired at birth; a condition on the
other hand, is something that is attained through a person's actions. 64
The argument put forth is that homelessness itself is not status, but rather
57. Id. at 532 (pointing out that the defendant was not convicted for being a chronic
alcoholic, but instead was convicted of public drunkenness, which unlike addiction, is an
affirmative act).
58. Id.; see also Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (explaining that on its face the present case
does not fall within the holding of Robinson since appellant was convicted, not for being a
chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion).
59. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 533.
60. Walters, supra note 42, at 1624.
61. See generally Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (1995); see also Joyce v.
City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (1994).
62. See Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1166-67 (noting that the entire thrust of Robinson's interpre-
tation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be in-
flicted only if the accused has committed some act, it does not deal with the question of
whether certain conduct cannot be constitutionally be punished because it is, in some sense
involuntary); see Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857 (explaining that the Court in Powell had refused
to extend Eighth Amendment protection to acts attendant to a status).
63. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 533 (noting that there was a definitional distinction be-
tween a status as in Robinson and a condition, which is involved in this case).
64. See Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1166 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S 660, 665-69, 667
fn.9 (1962)).
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a condition that was acquired through a person's actions, thereby making
the Robinson Doctrine inapplicable.65
However, any discussion of Powell necessitates a close reading of Jus-
tice White's concurring opinion. Justice White seems to suggest that the
holding in Powell would not be applicable to homeless people.66 He
noted that many chronic alcoholics have homes and choose to drink in
the privacy of their homes. 67 However, he went on to note that many
chronic alcoholics do not have homes outside the public streets.68 For
homeless alcoholics, therefore, there is no choice but to consume alcohol
in public. 69 Justice White argued that for those individuals, the law in
Powell might be shown to violate the Eighth Amendment.7 ° Although
the issue of homelessness was not addressed specifically by the court, Jus-
tice White's concurring opinion lends some authority to the proposition
that even though a law punishes an act, it may still unfairly affect the
homeless and thereby implicate the Eighth Amendment if it is impossible
for those persons to comply with the law.
D. Inadequate Shelter Space and the Eighth Amendment
In San Antonio, it is estimated that there are 3306 homeless men, wo-
men, and children looking for shelter at any one time.7' Unfortunately,
there are only two main shelters in the city, which together provide 1617
beds.72 Essentially, in a city lacking adequate shelter space, such as San
Antonio, a homeless person has only two options: to commit trespass by
falling asleep on private property; or to violate an anti-sleeping ordinance
by sleeping on public property. 73 In San Antonio, Ordinance 100379 pro-
hibits camping in public places without lawful permission.74 As a result, it
is impossible for a homeless person in San Antonio to avoid committing a
crime in order to satisfy the basic human need for sleep.75 Advocates for
65. Id.
66. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 550 (noting that for some alcoholics resisting drunkness in
public is impossible because they do not have homes, therefore the law in Powell as applied
to them violates the Eighth Amendment).
67. Id. at 551.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551 (1968).
71. AUSTIN/TRAVIS CouNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. DEP'T, A COMPARISON OF
HOMELESS SERVICES AMONG FIVE CITIES UTILIZING EXISTING DATA: AUSTIN, DALLAS,
HOUSTON, SAN ArONIO, AND SEATITLE, (2005), available at http://www.caction.org/Issue
Areas/Homelessness/HomelessServiceComparisonFiveCities.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Smith, supra note 30, at 293.
74. Meeting, supra note 8; see also SA Homeless Action, supra note 26.
75. Smith, supra note 30, at 93.
[Vol. 8:221
DOWN AND OUT IN SAN ANTONIO
the homeless contend that anti-sleeping ordinances, combined with a lack
of adequate shelter space, amount to a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.76
The Supreme Court has not dealt with whether insufficient shelter
space combined with an anti-sleeping ordinance is a violation of the
Eighth Amendment. This has lead to vastly different holdings in the
lower courts. Powell was a plurality opinion and did not specifically over-
rule Robinson, therefore, the lower courts have discretion to choose
whether to apply the holding in Robinson or the plurality opinion of
Powell.
This problem was recognized by the majority in Pottinger v. City of
Miami,7 7 which stated: "[A]lthough the law is well-established that a per-
son may not be punished for involuntary status, it is less settled whether
involuntary conduct that is inextricably related to that status may be pun-
ished."78 A court's decision to apply the holding in Robinson or the deci-
sion in Powell as controlling precedent is often the determining factor in
whether an anti-homeless ordinance will survive a constitutional attack
based on the Eighth Amendment. The following is a discussion of four
cases that have used the holdings of Robinson and Powell to determine
whether inadequate shelter space, combined with anti-camping or sleep-
ing laws violate the Eighth Amendment.79
1. Pottinger v. City of Miami
The plaintiffs in Pottinger v. City of Miami, filed a class action suit,
seeking an injunction against the City of Miami.8" The law at issue in that
case, substantially similar to one recently passed in San Antonio, prohib-
ited "any person to sleep on any of the streets, sidewalks, public places,
or upon the private property of another person without the consent of the
owner thereof."81 Both the Miami and San Antonio ordinances prevent
sleeping in public places.8" Although the court cited to both Robinson
76. Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and it's Criminalization, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 36 (1996).
77. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
78. Id. at 1563.
79. Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. City of Dallas,
860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, Johnson v. Dallas, 61 F.3d 442
(5th Cir. 1995).
80. Leckerman, supra note 23, at 552.
81. Id. (citing Miami, Fla., Code § 37-63 (1990)).
82. Compare San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance 100379 (Feb. 3, 2005) with Miami, Fla.,
Code § 37-63 (1990).
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and Powell, the court distinguished the situation of the plaintiffs in Pottin-
ger from that of the plaintiffs in Powell.83
The court in Pottinger stated that the Powell plurality was not con-
fronted with the same situation. The majority in Pottinger used the rea-
soning in Justice White's concurring opinion stating that although the
average intoxicated person may have a choice in where they consume
alcohol, a homeless person has "no realistic choice, but to live in public
places."84 The court in Pottinger also relied on expert witness testimony
that homeless people rarely have a choice in their homelessness; rather,
they are homeless due to a number of factors, including physical disabili-
ties, economic conditions, or psychological problems that they are power-
less to control.8 5
The City of Miami attempted to rebut this testimony with the argument
that, even if homelessness is an involuntary condition, a person still has
some control over their status as being homeless.86 The city, in attempt-
ing to establish the voluntary nature of homelessness, contrasted it with a
truly involuntary situation, such as a natural disaster resulting in loss the
of home.8 7 However, the majority in Pottinger rejected the city's distinc-
tion and stated that when a person becomes homeless because of mental
infirmities or economically hard times, the situation is no less involuntary
and that person has no more control over such situations than individuals
displaced by natural disasters.88 The district court in Pottinger granted
the injunction, holding that the ordinance punished homeless people for
innocent acts, such as sleeping and eating, for which they had no choice
but to perform in public.89 As a result, the Pottinger court ordered the
city of Miami to create specific locations called safe zones, where the
homeless could go and perform daily activities without fear of criminal
prosecution.90 The next two cases cite and expand on the holding in
Pottinger.9'
83. See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1563 (holding that unlike the Powell case, homeless
are unable to make a choice as to whether to live on public property).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1563.
86. Id. at 1564.
87. Id.
88. See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564-65 (rejecting the city's arguments as there are
no reasonable alternatives).
89. Id. at 1560.
90. Maria Foscarinis, Kelly Cunningham-Bowers & Kristin E. Brown, Out of Sight -
Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward the Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 145, 154 (1999).
91. See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Johnson
v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, Johnson v.
Dallas, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995).
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2. Johnson v. City of Dallas
Johnson v. City of Dallas9 2 is significant for homeless advocates in San
Antonio because it was decided in, and impacted Dallas, Texas, which is a
similar major metropolitan area in Texas.9 3 The City of Dallas enacted an
ordinance that criminalized the act of sleeping in public, even if an indi-
vidual was homeless and had no alternative place to rest.94 Citing Robin-
son and Powell, the majority in Johnson held that the City of Dallas's
anti-sleeping ordinance violated the Eighth Amendment. 95 The court
held that in order to maintain life, a person must engage in certain acts,
one of which is sleep.96 The court noted that the plaintiffs in Johnson had
no alternative place to sleep, because the city of Dallas had insufficient
shelter space. 97 The court noted that homelessness was involuntary and
that the homeless of Dallas had no place to live other than public prop-
erty.98 The court went on to hold that, although the city was not required
to provide shelter space, it could not enforce an anti-sleeping ordinance if
it failed to provide its homeless citizens with an alternative to sleeping in
public.99
3. Joel v. City of Orlando
In Joel v. City of Orlando,'t ° attorneys for the homeless challenged an
ordinance that prevented camping on public property.10 1 The advocates
in Joel also cited the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment as the basis for their argument." 2 The plaintiff in
Joel cited Robinson and argued that the law punished a person's status of
being homeless, thereby making it unconstitutional. 3 In addition, the
plaintiff in Joel relied on the Pottinger and Johnson decisions.0 4 The Joel
92. See Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 344.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 350.
97, See Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 350.
98. Id. at 350.
99. Alexandar Tsesis, Eliminating the Destitution of America's Homeless: A Fair, Fed-
eral Approach, 10 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 103, 116 (2000).
100. Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 2000).
101. Id. at 1356.
102. Id. at 1361 (noting that the plaintiff, Joel, argued that Section 43.52 of the city
ordinance violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punish-
ment because it punishes his homeless status).
103. Id.
104. Id. (noting that the plaintiff Joel relied on Pottinger where a district court held
that the City of Miami's practice of arresting homeless individuals for such basic activities
as sleeping and eating in public places constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff
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court distinguished the Orlando ordinance from the ordinances in Pottin-
ger and Johnson and ultimately upheld the City of Orlando's
ordinance.
10 5
The Joel court noted that the courts in Pottinger and Johnson held that
the lack of homeless shelter space made sleeping in public involuntary.
1 6
Pottinger and Johnson held that "because of the unavailability of low-
income housing or alternative shelter, plaintiffs have no choice but to
conduct involuntary, life-sustaining activities in public places."'0 7 The
Joel court cited the availability of homeless shelter space in Orlando to
distinguish the situation in Pottinger and Johnson. The majority in Joel
noted that there was a large homeless shelter in the City of Orlando that
had "never reached its maximum capacity and that no individual had
been turned away because there was none."'0 8 The Joel court stated that
"[tihe city is constitutionally allowed to regulate where 'camping' occurs,
and the availability of the shelter space means that Joel had an opportu-
nity to comply with the ordinance. ' '1°9
The distinguishing factor between Joel and Johnson was the availability
of shelter space. As noted above, the City of Orlando in Joel was able to
show that there was sufficient space available to homeless residents,
thereby allowing them an alternative to sleeping in public. Also noted
above, the advocates for the homeless in Johnson were able to show that
there was not adequate shelter space in the City of Dallas, thus, the city
was criminalizing conduct which was involuntary.
4. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana
While a court may hold that a municipality has insufficient homeless
shelter space, such a finding of fact does not guarantee that ordinances,
which prevent public camping and sleeping, will be found invalid." 0 In
Tobe v. City of Santa Ana,"' the California Supreme Court upheld a stat-
ute that prevented public camping, even though a lower court found that
the city had only enough shelter for 332 of its estimated 3,000 home-
also relied on Johnson which held that a sleeping in public ordinance as applied to the
homeless was unconstitutional).
105. See Joel, 232 F.3d at 1362.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992));
see also Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 351 (N.D. Tex 1994) ("As long as the
homeless have no other place to be, they may not be prevented from sleeping in public.").
108. Joel, 232 F.3d at 1362.
109. Id.
110. Walters, supra note 42, at 1636 (citing Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
386, 387-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
111. See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (1995).
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less. 112 The lower court in Tobe, citing insufficient shelter space, found
that the ordinance punished the "involuntary status of being homeless"
therefore violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.'
3
However, the California Supreme Court reversed the holding and held
that the ordinance neither punished the "involuntary status of being
homeless" nor punished a person for the condition of living in poverty.11 4
The California Supreme Court noted that the holding in Powell stated
that the Robinson Doctrine was only applied where a criminal penalty
was inflicted upon a person who had not committed an act, not on
whether a law could constitutionally punish someone because in some
way their act was involuntary. 115 The Supreme Court of California failed
to recognize the condition of someone's homelessness as a status, holding
that there was a difference between status and condition.116 The court in
Tobe noted that the Supreme Court has yet to hold that the Eighth
Amendment forbids punishment of acts that are derived from a person's
status." 7 The Supreme Court of California also cited that it was unclear
whether the plaintiffs had any alternatives to their condition of homeless-
ness, and whether they had contributed conduct that led to their
homelessness.1
18
The City of San Antonio often lacks sufficient homeless shelter space
to meet the city's needs." 9 Shelter space for homeless men overflows
when the temperature drops below forty degrees, and family shelters turn
away parents and their children almost every night.'2 ° The city, by its
own admission in the Ten-Year Plan, stated that it did not have sufficient
shelter space. 12 ' In addition, the City of San Antonio does not have a
twenty-four hour shelter that gives homeless people a place to go during
the daytime.' 2 2 A court confronted by the situation in San Antonio,
where there is insufficient shelter space and the city has enacted a law
that prevents public sleeping or camping, should apply Robinson's culpa-
bility test rather than Powell's act-excluding test. If a court applies Powell
112. Walters, supra note 42, at 1636 (citing Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387-88).
113. See Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1166.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1167.
119. Dick J. Reavis, Agony of Homelessness Grows in S.A., MySA.com, Apr. 20, 2003
at http://www.mysanantonio.com/global-includes/printstory.jsp?path/=News/metro/stories/
983475.html.
120. Id.
121. TEN-YEAR PLAN, supra note 4.
122. The Other San Antonio, supra note 9.
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to a law that targets the homeless by preventing public sleeping or camp-
ing, it will lead to logical inconsistencies, as evidenced in the Tobe case. 1 23
The Tobe court, in applying Powell, made the argument that homeless-
ness is not a status, but a condition. 124 The court in Tobe noted that it
was difficult to define status, but that certain factors should be consid-
ered, including the involuntariness of that acquisition and whether or not
the characteristic was present at birth.125 The court in Tobe went on to
note that many homeless might have committed acts that contributed to
their status.126 Relying on this logic alone, the court in Tobe failed to
realize that many people who are homeless are born into that status. 27
As Edward J. Walters points out, another problem with Powell's act-
excluding test is that nearly every status manifests itself in some action,
therefore Powell's act excluding test makes it easy for a state to punish a
person's status "by simply punishing the acts inherent to it.' 128 Take the
example of a person that is a diabetic. If a state outlawed the taking of
insulin, it would be criminalizing an act, but this would indirectly and
unfairly punish the status of being a diabetic.
Because it is likely that the plurality in Powell would hold that punish-
ing a person for being homeless is unconstitutional, it then logically fol-
lows that it would be cruel and unusual to punish a person for acts that
the status of homelessness necessitates, such as sleeping in public.'29
Sleeping is an act, but as the court in Pottinger affirmed that the need for
sleep is essential to sustain life.' 3° Given that a city with insufficient shel-
ter space has not provided a homeless person an alternative to sleeping in
public, a homeless person must choose whether to violate the law or to
perform a basic function of life. Forcing an innocent person into making
such a choice is both cruel and unusual.
One of the reasons that the plurality in Powell created the "act test"
was out of fear that a broad interpretation of Robinson would discourage
123. Walters, supra note 42, at 1629-31 (noting that Powell's act excluding test is logi-
cally flawed and difficult to apply).
124. See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1166 (Cal. 1995).
125. Id. (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665-69 (1962)).
126. Id. at 1105 (noting that it was far from clear whether the homeless had any alter-
natives to either the condition or the conduct that led to homelessness and ultimately to
the ticket).
127. Walters, supra note 42, at 1639 (noting that the Supreme Court based its ruling in
Robinson on the fact that one might acquire a drug addiction involuntarily at birth, the
court in Joyce failed to see this problem in the homelessness context).
128. Id. at 1628.
129. See Edward J. Walters, Comment, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment Protection
for Do-or-Die Acts of the Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1619, 1631 (1995).
130. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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traditional notions of criminal culpability.' The court used the example
that, if the holding of Robinson were extended, it might be hard for a
state to criminally punish someone for murder if they had an uncontrolla-
ble urge to kill.'3 a This problem is not faced when Robinson's culpability
test is applied to a city that has insufficient shelter space and has enacted
an anti-sleeping or camping ordinance that is directed at the homeless.
33
A court confronted with this situation would make a factual determina-
tion as to whether the city has sufficient homeless shelter space. If the
city does have sufficient space, the ordinance will likely be upheld. If not,
then it is likely that the challenged ordinance will be overturned. In this
way, cities can be free to restrict where a person sleeps and still protect
vital economic development, if they uphold their civic responsibility in
providing an alternative to sleeping in public.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AGGRESSIVE
PANHANDLING STATUTES
San Antonio Ordinance 100380 prohibits aggressive solicitation in pub-
lic places.' The Supreme Court has not specifically dealt with the issue
of whether aggressive soliciting statutes, especially in the context of a per-
son who begs, are constitutional; in fact the Court has not even decided
whether panhandling is protected free speech. 135 Therefore, it is impor-
tant to take a step-by-step approach in analyzing whether the City of San
Antonio's ordinance preventing "aggressive" solicitation will be upheld
in light of a constitutional challenge. This section of the paper will ana-
lyze the constitutionality of San Antonio's aggressive solicitation ordi-
nance in relation to a homeless person who panhandles or begs for
money.
131. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 534 (1968). The Court points out that the most
troubling aspects of this case, were Robinson to be extended to meet it, would be the scope
and content of what could only be a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility. The
Court further used the example that if the plaintiff could not be convicted of public intoxi-
cation, it is difficult to see how a State could convict an individual for murder, if that
individual, while exhibiting normal behavior in all other respects, suffers from a compul-
sion to kill. Id.
132. Id.
133. Walters, supra note 129, at 1641-49 (explaining that a court should invalidate a
law as cruel and unusual that prohibits acts that people have absolutely no choice but to
do. Further explaining that this approach is narrow in scope, so there is little chance of
opening the floodgates feared by many.).
134. Meeting, supra note 8.
135. Darryl C. Delmonico, Comment, Aggressive Panhandling Legislation and the
Constitution: Evisceration of Fundamental Rights - or Valid Restrictions Upon Offensive
Conduct?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557, 559 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court has
not even considered the constitutionality of passive panhandling statutes.).
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Many lower courts have decided cases involving soliciting statutes in
relation to panhandling, the first step will be to determine how these
courts have classified panhandling in general; and whether the courts held
that a general ban on panhandling was content neutral or content based,
in relation to First Amendment case law. Determining whether a law is
content based or content neutral is important because a law that is a con-
tent based restriction will be subject to a much stricter form of review by
a court and therefore is less likely to be upheld.1 36 The next step will look
at how courts have ruled on statutes that prevent "aggressive"
panhandling.
A. General Prohibitions on Panhandling
1. Content Neutral
An important step in predicting how a court might rule on a statute
banning all panhandling is to determine whether a general ban on pan-
handling is content neutral under the First Amendment.137 Content neu-
tral statues will apply to all types of speech and do not prevent any
particular subject matter from being expressed.138
If a court determines a law is content neutral, there are two tests it may
apply: the O'Brien Test or the Time, Place, Manner Test.139 These two
tests are utilized by a court applying mid-level scrutiny analysis to a gov-
ernment ordinance, but again only if the ordinance is content neutral.1 40
If an ordinance is deemed to be content based neither test will be used.1 41
The O'Brien test has four factors and courts have applied it to city ordi-
nances that combine both speech and non-speech components. 142 The
O'Brien test provides that:
Governmental regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the government; [2] if it furthers an impor-
136. ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307 (Editorial Ad-
visory Board ed., Aspen Law & Business 2001) (1949).
137. Delmonico, supra note 135, at 564 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974)).
138. National Coalition Against Censorship, NCAC Art Law Library Glossary, http://
www.ncac.org/art-law/glossary.cfm (last visited March 14, 2005).
139. IDES & MAY, supra note 136, at 297 ("The O'Brien test is nothing more than the
standard time, place and manner test. .. that the Court generally applies to content-neutral
regulations of speech" (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298
& n.8 (1984))).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Charles Mitchell, Note, Aggressive Panhandling legislation and Free Speech
Claims: Begging for Trouble, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 697, 703 (1994) (quoting O'Brien v.
United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
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tant or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; [4] and if the
incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
143
A case that illustrates a court's application of the O'Brien test in rela-
tion to panhandling is a case decided by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, Young v. New York City Transit Authority.
14 4
In Young, the New York City Transit Authority enacted an ordinance
that prevented people inside the New York City subway system from beg-
ging for or soliciting money for any purpose. 145 Advocates for New
York's homeless argued that begging was expressive conduct that war-
ranted full protection under the First Amendment. 146 The court first had
to determine whether begging was expressive conduct, so the court ap-
plied a test that asked whether "an intent to convey a particularized mes-
sage was present, and whether the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.' 147 The majority in Young
failed to recognize begging as expressive conduct, because it was not "in-
tertwined with a 'particularized message.' ,141 The court in Young further
explained that individuals who beg are doing so to collect money not to
convey a social or political message.' 49
The plaintiffs, advocates for the homeless, argued that begging was not
indistinguishable from charitable solicitation which the Supreme Court
held was protected speech in Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment.5' However, the court in Young was not persuaded by this ar-
gument and it held that while charitable organizations often disseminated
ideas about political and social issues, begging in the subway communi-
cated no such messages, but rather often amounted to "nothing less than
a menace to the common good.' 5 ' For these reasons, the court in Young
found that begging was not expressive conduct although it went on to
143. Id.; see also Young v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 157 (2d Cir. 1990)
(applying the O'Brien test).
144. See Young, 903 F.2d 146.
145. Id. at 147.
146. Id. at 152-53.
147. Id. at 153 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (emphasis
in original)).
148. Mitchell, supra note 142, at 702 (citing Young, 903 F.2d at 153 (quoting Spence,
418 U.S. at 410)).
149. See Young, 903 F.2d at 153.
150. Id. (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620
(1980)).
151. Id. at 155-156.
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assume that begging was some form of communication the O'Brien test
and applied a more lenient standard of judicial scrutiny.15 2
In citing the O'Brien test, the Young court held that a subway was a
non-public forum, and that there were alternate forums available for pan-
handlers.' 53 In addition, the Young court held that the government had a
strong governmental interest in providing a safe environment in the sub-
way, therefore, the New York City Transit Authority was able to limit
First Amendment protections. 154
The Young case provides an example of how a city might regulate
speech within a confined area, or in a non-public forum, but, in contrast,
San Antonio's ordinance prevents panhandling in a public forum. 55 San
Antonio's ordinance prevents aggressive solicitation in public areas. For
this reason the Young court's rationale of being able to limit expressive
conduct in a confined area does not apply to the San Antonio ordi-
nance.' 56 As a result, a court, if asked to review the constitutionality of
the San Antonio ordinance would be incorrect if they decided to rely on
Young. A case that addressed the situation of a city's attempt to pro-
scribe panhandling in all public places was Loper v. New York City Police
Department.1
57
2. Content Based Restrictions
In cases where a court decides a law is content based, the court will
usually apply a strict scrutiny analysis.158 Content based restrictions
come about in many forms - a law could proscribe certain topics or sub-
jects, it could involve a personal view point, or it could limit what a per-
son says based upon his or her identity.15 9 In Loper, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit seemed to reverse itself from its
decision in Young, when confronted by a law that prevented peaceful
begging throughout New York City.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Loper,
did not apply the O'Brien test, as it did in Young, because of the nature of
the regulation that was before the court.'6 ' In Young, the regulation pre-
vented begging in the confined atmosphere of the subway, where as in
152. Id. at 157.
153. Mitchell, supra note 142, at 703 (1994) (citing Young, 903 F.2d at 161).
154. Id. (citing Young, 903 F.2d at 158-60).
155. Meeting, supra note 8 ("[A] person cannot aggressively panhandle in any public
place") (emphasis added).
156. See Young, 903 F.2d at 158.
157. Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
158. IDES & MAY, supra note 136, at 307.
159. Id.
160. See Loper, 999 F.2d at 705.
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Loper the ordinance prevented begging throughout the entire city of New
York.161 In Loper, the court held that in public forums, the government
may not prohibit all forms of communicative activity.1 62 The court then
had to decide two questions: 1) whether begging was protected free
speech; and 2) in what type of forum was the City of New York attempt-
ing to prevent begging. 163 To determine if begging was a form of commu-
nication the court relied on the reasoning in Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment.
1 64
Schaumburg cited prior authorities that clearly established that solicita-
tion of charitable causes is within the scope of First Amendment protec-
tion.165 Schaumburg concluded that solicitation is subject to regulation,
but courts must take into account that solicitation for money is inter-
twined with other forms of speech that seek support such as social, eco-
nomic, or political issues, and that without solicitation, many forms of this
communication would cease.'6 6 Relying on this reasoning, the court in
Loper held that there was little difference between individuals who solicit
for charity and individuals who solicit for themselves.167
Next, the court had to decide the forum within which the city was at-
tempting to regulate First Amendment conduct.1 68 The majority in Loper
first applied the "public forum" analysis of the First Amendment, as out-
lined in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Associa-
tion,16 9 to determine the type of public forum. 7 °
The Supreme Court in Perry outlined three areas of public fora: prop-
erty that has been traditionally available for public assembly; property in
which the state's power to regulate as a non-public forum is equivalent to
that of private owner of property; and, property the state has opened to
use for public expressive activity.' 7 1 Loper held that the New York City
ordinance fit within the scope of the third category. 172 After holding that
the ordinance attempted to prevent speech in a traditional public forum,
161. Id. (noting that the outlaw of begging throughout New York City is not an inci-
dental limitation of the First Amendment).
162. Id. at 704 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983)).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 704-05; Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980).
165. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
166. Id.
167. See Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
168. Id.
169. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
170. See Loper, 999 F.2d at 702-03.
171. Id. at 704.
172. Mitchell, supra note 142, at 705.
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the court noted that communication cannot be regulated to the same ex-
tent in public forum as it can be in a private forum.173 The court held that
the law was not content neutral because it prohibited all speech related to
begging, but still chose to apply a mid-level strutiny test: the Time, Place,
Manner test.174
The Time, Place, Manner test states that time, place, manner restric-
tions can be constitutional if they "'are [1] justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, . .[2] narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and . . [3] leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information."",175 After applying the
Time, Place, Manner test, the majority in Loper concluded that there was
no governmental interest in preventing peaceful begging and the statute
was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.176 In
addition, the Loper court found that the statute did not offer alternative
avenues of communication for beggars to conduct their activity. 177
Therefore, the court held that the statute failed all aspects of the Time,
Place, Manner test.178
Similar to the ordinance scrutinized by the Loper court, San Antonio
Ordinance 100380 clearly states that an individual cannot "solicit" in a
public place. 1 79 Although the Young and the Loper decisions applied dif-
ferent tests to determine whether ordinances that prevented panhandling
were constitutional, it appears that the deciding factor was the forum in
which the regulation took place.'18 A court will be more likely to say that
a statute is content neutral if it proscribes speech in a specific location,
such as the crowded confines of a subway. In contrast, a court is more
likely to apply a content based restriction if the law prevents speech in all
areas.
Because San Antonio's ordinance prevents aggressive soliciting in all
public areas, the holding in Loper is more persuasive and provides a good
starting point for a court to analyze an ordinance that prevents panhan-
dling in public places. However, Loper was concerned with peaceful pan-
173. See Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
174. Mitchell, supra note 142, at 706.
175. IDES & MAY, supra note 136, at 348 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
176. Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993).
177. Id.
178. Mitchell, supra note 142, at 706.
179. Meeting, supra note 8 (San Antonio's ordinance prohibits solicitation in public
places, Loper ordinance prohibits wandering about in a public place for the purpose of
begging).
180. See generally Loper, 999 F.2d at 705; Young v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d
146, 157 (2d Cir. 1990).
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handling and San Antonio's ordinance proscribes aggressive solicitation
and therefore, a court must delve further into the issue.
B. Aggressive Panhandling
San Antonio's ordinance goes one step further and prevents "aggres-
sive" panhandling. 181 The court in Loper stated that the ordinance in
New York failed because it prevented all "peaceful" panhandling in the
city. 182 After Loper, city governments began narrowing their ordinances
to prevent "aggressive" panhandling.18 3 The Supreme Court has not de-
cided whether aggressive panhandling ordinances are constitutional, thus
it will be helpful to look at how the lower federal courts have addressed
and decided the issue.
Laws that proscribe aggressive panhandling have been attacked using
both the void for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. The void for
vagueness doctrine states that a law can be voided for vagueness if "it
'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contem-
plated conduct is forbidden by the statute,' and it encourages arbitrary
and erratic arrests and convictions."'' The overbreadth doctrine states
that even if a law is clear, it may be overbroad if it "prohibits constitu-
tionally protected conduct.' 85 An example of overbreadth would be a
law that prevented a person from communicating to another person a
threat to commit any criminal act.' 86 Although threatening a person
would not be protected speech, threatening to commit a criminal act
would include speech that amounts to nothing more than harmless ex-
pressions. 187 A case that illustrates the void for vagueness doctrine and
the overbreadth doctrine is Roulette v. City of Seattle.1 88
181. Meeting, supra note 8.
182. See Loper, 999 F.2d at 705.
183. William L. Mitchell, II, Comment, Secondary Effects Analysis: A Balanced Ap-
proach to the Problem of Prohibitions on Aggressive Panhandling, 24 U. BALT. L. REV.
291, 311 (1995) (explaining that anti-aggressive begging statutes and ordinances are fast
becoming the weapon of choice for cities and municipalities in their fight to preserve public
safety, societal order, and some semblance of a viable economic base).
184. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (quoting United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937))).
185. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972).
186. Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1452 (1994) (citing Wurtz v. Risley,
719 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1983)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1453.
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1. Roulette v. City of Seattle
In Roulette, the city of Seattle sought to criminalize "aggressive beg-
ging.' '189 Advocates for the homeless in Roulette challenged the ordi-
nance as overbroad and void for vagueness.' 90
The court in Roulette held that the statute was not overbroad or void
for vagueness. 191 The majority in Roulette like the court in Young failed
to recognize begging as expressive conduct.' 92 Roulette also upheld the
City of Seattle's statute because the ordinance had an intent element in
its language which defined "aggressive begging" as an "intent to intimi-
date."' 93 The court in Roulette held that the ordinance was sufficiently
limited by the intent requirement and the definition section defining "in-
timidate" and therefore did not "reach speech protected by the First
Amendment., 19 4 The statute also went on to state that intimidation was
conduct which would make a "reasonable person fearful or feel com-
pelled to give money or property."' 95 Using this reasoning the Roulette
court held that the statute did not implicate the First Amendment be-
cause threats are not protected speech.196 The majority in Roulette held
that the limiting nature of the ordinance and the language it targeted pre-
vented the ordinance from violating the First Amendment.1 97 The court
in Roulette, after holding that the law was not overbroad, went on to hold
that because of the limiting nature of the ordinance it did not implicate
the void for vagueness doctrine.
To return to the focus of this section, San Antonio's "aggressive" solic-
iting ordinance can be distinguished from the above cited cases because
there is no intent requirement in its statutory language.' 98 The court in
Roulette held that the City of Seattle's intent requirement prevented the
189. Id. at 1451. The Seattle ordinance went on to define aggressive begging as "to
beg with the intent to intimidate another person into giving money or goods." Id. (citing
SMC § 12A.12.015(A)(1)).
190. Id.
191. See Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1453.
192. Id. at 1451 (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding
that begging did not implicate expressive conduct or communicative activity)).
193. Id. at 1453. The ordinance further defines "intimidate as conduct which would
make a reasonable person fearful or feel compelled." Id. at 1451 (citing SMC
§ 12A.12.015(A)(2)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1447.
196. Id. at 1451 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
197. See generally Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (1994); see also State
v. Brown, 748 P.2d 276, 279 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
198. Compare Meeting, supra note 8, with Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1451 (citing SMC
§ 12A.12.015(A)).
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ordinance from being vague, and thereby making it constitutional;199 but
a challenger to the City of San Antonio's ordinance, citing the lack of an
intent element in the statute, could use the reasoning in Roulette to make
a good argument that the ordinance is overbroad or vague. 200 As it
stands, using Roulette as controlling precedent, it is likely that a court
would strike down San Antonio's ordinance as vague or overbroad. The
reasoning is because soliciting is a form of speech and aggressive is not
adequately defined the statute could reach speech that is protected by the
First Amendment.2 °1
If the city of San Antonio rewrote its ordinance to include an intent
element, would it still be possible to mount an attack on the ordinance?
Roulette is persuasive authority and would be influential in analyzing an
aggressive panhandling statute that included an intent element within it.
If Roulette's holding were controlling it is likely that if San Antonio's or-
dinance were rewritten to include an intent element, it would survive an
attack based on void for vagueness or overbreadth. However, Roulette is
not the only court that has addressed an aggressive panhandling statute.
Other courts have held that aggressive panhandling statutes were content
based restrictions that were not narrowly tailed to achieve a compelling
government interest.202 In addition, courts have held that aggressive pan-
handling statutes violate a person's Fourteenth Amendment right to
Equal Protection.2" 3
C. Equal Protection
An argument used by advocates for the homeless are that aggressive
panhandling statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendments right to equal
protection.2° One argument that has been used by advocates for the
homeless is, the homeless constitute a suspect class and therefore any law
that targets them should be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. 20 5 How-
ever, do to the nature of defining the homeless in this context this argu-
ment has not met with much success. 2 6 An Equal Protection claim that
199. See Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1449.
200. Id. at 1449; see also Papachristou at 158 (1972) (noting that a Florida statute was
declared unconstitutional for not distinguishing conduct that is harmful from innocent
conduct).
201. See generally Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1449.
202. See generally Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
203. Id. at 1324-25 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)).
204. Id.
205. See Leckerman, supra note 23, at 562-65.
206. Delmonico, supra note 135, at 559, (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (declaring that classifications drawn along economic lines "are
traditionally disfavored;" however, stopping short of according "suspect" status to
indigents)).
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has met with greater success states that a law proscribes a fundamental
right and in doing so treats similarly situated people differently.2 °7 A
case that is especially helpful in analyzing San Antonio's ordinance is Ca-
rey v. Brown,208 because it dealt with a law that involved the First
Amendment, but not a suspect class. 20 9
1. Carey v. Brown
In Carey residents were arrested for picketing in front of the mayor of
Chicago's residence.210 They were arrested for violating a state statute
that prevented picketing in residential areas.21' The statute had several
exceptions; the law would not apply if a person picketed a residence that
was used as a place of business, if the business was involved in a labor
dispute, or the residence was commonly used as a place that was used to
discuss "subjects of general public interest., 212 The Court held that be-
cause the ordinance prohibits peaceful picketing on a public street it reg-
ulates expressive conduct that falls under the First Amendment.213 The
Court overturned the ordinance because under this law speech concern-
ing labor disputes was given special protection under the First Amend-
ment.214 The Court held that "selective exclusions from a public forum
may not be based on content alone, and may not be referenced by con-
tent alone., 215 However the Court in Carey held that content-based re-
striction on fundamental First Amendment liberties may be a legitimate
exercise of government police power in limited circumstances, and in
these limited circumstances the municipality must regulate speech within
a reasonable time, place, and manner.216 A court case that dealt with an
aggressive panhandling statute expanding upon the holding in Carey was
Blair v. Shanahan217
2. Blair v. Shanahan
In Blair v. Shanahan, the plaintiff brought a civil rights action against
the city of San Francisco, protesting an ordinance enacted by the city to
prevent persons from being accosted by those begging or soliciting for
207. See generally Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1315.
208. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980).
209. Delmonico, supra note 135, at 585.
210. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 457.
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38 § 21.1-2 (1977)).
213. Id. at 460.
214. Id. at 466.
215. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 463.
216. Id. at 470.
217. See Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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money.218 When arrested, the plaintiff, Blair, was unemployed and relied
on begging as a source of income to support himself.
219
The city, in its attempt to defend the statute, asserted that begging was
not protected speech under the constitution and cited to Young for sup-
port of their argument.220 The court, however, was not persuaded by the
city's argument and noted that the statute in Young prevented panhan-
dling within the crowded confines of a New York subway, whereas the
ordinance in Blair proscribed begging on the city's streets. 221 The court
in Blair noted that the Young court distinguished solicitation for charita-
ble purposes and begging by stating "solicitors for charitable causes often
convey clearly articulated information to their target about a particular
cause or idea whereas beggars do not necessarily convey any such infor-
mation to the target listener., 22 2 However, the court in Blair failed to
follow this reasoning, noting that in recent Supreme Court cases, profes-
sional fund raisers were given full First Amendment protection.223 In ad-
dition, the majority in Blair also held that because a beggar represents
themselves when they ask for money, their speech should not be ren-
dered unprotected.224 In response to the city's argument that protecting
its citizens from aggressive or intimidating conduct was an important
goal, the court held that this goal could be achieved by another statute
that did not violate the First Amendment. 22 5 The court provided several
examples of content-neutral statutes which successfully accomplished the
same goals.226
In addition, the court in Blair held that the San Francisco statute vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection because it dis-
criminated "between lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the content
of the communication., 227 The court in Blair held that if the statute
banned all speech that related to approaching another person it would be
218. Id. at 1317 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(c)).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1324-26.
221. Id. at 1322.
222. See Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1323 (citing Young v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d
146, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1990).
223. Id. at 1322 (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980)).
224. Id. at 1323.
225. Id. at 1324.
226. Id. (citing other California statutes preventing robbery, assault, and willful and
malicious obstruction of public places).
227. See Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1325 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980)).
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upheld because it would treat all speech the same.228 The city, to per-
suade the court of its position, stated the argument that the ordinance did
not treat beggars differently under the law and therefore was not a viola-
tion of Equal Protection. 229 However the Blair majority held that this
was not the issue, the issue was "whether all who approach others and
speak to them are treated alike., 2 30
A court reviewing San Antonio's aggressive panhandling ordinance
should follow the holding of Blair and decide that San Antonio's ordi-
nance is unconstitutional. The Blair court notes that the Supreme Court
has held that charitable solicitation is protected speech.23' It flows logi-
cally then that a person's speech should not go unprotected just because
they solicit money for themselves.232 It is true that San Antonio has a
sufficient interest in protecting its citizens from threatening conduct, but
as the court in Blair notes this can be proscribed by a statute that does
not implicate the First Amendment.233
It appears that San Antonio's aggressive solicitation ordinance would
survive a constitutional attack based on equal protection because on its
face it bans all solicitation that is aggressive regardless of the reason for
the solicitation. However in crafting the statute to avoid an equal protec-
tion claim San Antonio's aggressive panhandling statute is open to a void
for vagueness and overbreadth attack, because it limits speech that is con-
stitutionally protected.234
V. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL/CONCLUDING REMARKS
For William and Sue Kamstra, it took five months to lose every-
thing. The couple and their three children were living in a three-bed-
room home in Bellflower, Calif. They had a two-car garage and fruit
trees in the backyard. He earned more than $40,000 a year working in
customer service, providing operational support in the music division
of Yamaha.
But then they were beset by personal financial problems, which
caused them to miss house payments. Their home was foreclosed
228. Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that if the
statute banned any "approach" where the alleged miscreant spoke to the victim first, its
position would be strong).
229. Id. at 1325.
230. Id.
231. See generally Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
232. See Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1323.
233. See id. at 1323; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.02 (Vernon 1996 & Supp.
2005) (preventing unlawful restraint); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon 1996 Supp.
2005) (preventing assault).
234. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972).
[Vol. 8:221
DOWN AND OUT IN SAN ANTONIO
upon. They planned to rent an apartment, but then William lost his
job, and they were unable to get back on their feet. An accident left
their van totaled, so they had no way to get around. They stored their
belongings and moved to a hotel until their money ran out in June.
Now, they spend their nights at the Union Rescue Mission, a Los An-
geles shelter.
During the day, William looks for work while Sue takes the children
to the library. In 20 years of marriage, this is the first time the Kam-
stras have been homeless.
"If he hadn't gotten laid off, we'd have rented an apartment. We
would have been OK," Sue says. The children expect to resume
school in the area this fall.
"This is horrendous. You have a feeling of such alienation," says
William, 43. His daughter is 14, and his sons are 12 and 11. "You have
this view of homeless people, but I have one beer a year on my birth-
day, and I don't do drugs. But there are a lot of families here, a lot of
children and babies in strollers. " 23
5
The Kamstra's example is not out of the ordinary. With a lagging econ-
omy more and more workers and their families are a "paycheck away
from losing their homes., 236 This problem is only exacerbated by a weak
job market, rising credit card debt and the soaring prices of homes.23 7
The face of homelessness is changing; it now reflects a harsh reality that
many families either through a recent job loss or a stroke of bad luck are
now without a home.238 This is just one of the many reasons that we
should care about laws that target those less fortunate than us.
Using the laws to remove homeless people from the economic areas of
downtown brings about not only questionable constitutional issues, but
also raises moral issues for a municipal government. Although advocates
for the homeless in San Antonio have a chance for success in fighting San
Antonio's homeless ordinances, the city could better serve its citizens if it
provided resources to help its homeless population rather than expending
resources fighting litigation.
The problem of homelessness is complex and there is no easy solution.
The homeless are a diverse group of individuals with a broad-range of
235. Stephanie Armour, Homeless Grows as More Live Check-to-Check, USA To-
DAY, Aug. 12, 2003, at Al, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2003-08-
11-homeless x.htm.
236. Id.
237. ld.
238. Id.
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special needs and problems.2 39 However the City of San Antonio could
start on the path to providing real solutions if they were to take the right
steps. The first step would be to establish safe zones where homeless
citizens could camp and not be subject to arrest or a fine. This could be
an interim step until the City of San Antonio could provide real help to
its homeless citizens by providing a twenty-four hour shelter. In addition
to allowing homeless people to be off the streets during the day, a twenty-
four hour shelter will allow homeless people to have a more regulated
schedule allowing them to take showers and look for employment.2 n
With the right security within the shelter homeless citizens will be able to
have their belongings secured as they search for employment. 241 Addi-
tionally, a twenty-four hour shelter would allow a city to segregate its
homeless citizens and determine which ones need drug counseling or
medical help, and which ones are readily employable.
We should care because the sad fact is that we might find ourselves
sharing the plight of the homeless.
239. Jennifer Hodulik, The Drug Court Model as a Response to "Broken Windows"
Criminal Justice for the Homeless Mentally 111, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1073, 1081
(2001) (noting that the homeless encompass a broad spectrum of groups that are not ho-
mogeneous and do not require the same types of assistance to address their needs).
240. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City and County of San Francisco, FY 2005-
2006 Shelter Service Enhancements (June 29, 2005), http://www.sfgov.org/site/mayor-page.
asp?id=33016.
241. Id.
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